



Agenda

- FATF Review of PEPs
- Enhanced Due Diligence for high risk customers, including PEPs
- DFSA STR Statistics
- Best Practice in STR preparation



FATF Review of PEPs

- FATF released a consultation paper in October
 2010 Review of Standards
- Responses to paper closed on 7 January 2011
- Paper stated that United Nations Convention on Corruption 2003 (Merida Convention) would have an impact on standard on PEPs



FATF Review of PEPs (cont'd)

- FATF is considering following approach:
 - Leave foreign PEPs as higher risk;
 - Require reasonable measures to determine if customer is a domestic PEP; and if so
 - Require enhanced due diligence if higher risk.
- Also considering changing obligation with respect to family members and close associates of PEPs
- New proposal to focus on cases where PEP is beneficial owner



Enhanced Due Diligence for High Risk Customers, Including PEPs

- What does Enhanced Due Diligence (EDD) mean?
- No internationally agreed definition



Enhanced Due Diligence for High Risk Customers, Including PEPs

- "A rigorous and robust process of investigation over and above (KYC) procedures, that seeks with reasonable assurance to verify and validate the customer's identity; understand and test the customer's profile, business and account activity; and identify relevant adverse information and risk assess the potential for money laundering and / or terrorist financing to support actionable decisions to mitigate against financial, regulatory and reputational risk and ensure regulatory compliance." - Peter Warrack, July 2006 edition of **ACAMS Today**
- DFSA has not defined EDD



Enhanced Due Diligence for High Risk Customers, Including PEPs

- Appendix A.2.2 AML Rulebook
 - Analysis of complex structures
 - Appropriate measures to establish source of wealth
 - Development of a profile of business relationship to monitor transactions and accounts
 - Senior management approval
 - Regular oversight
- Recent SEO letter of 27 January 2011 reminded all firms of obligations with PEPs
- While not strictly AML centric the recent UNSC resolutions have focused firms of the need to know who the ultimate beneficiary is
- It is all about risk based assessments



STR Statistics Summary

- Since 2005 the DFSA has received a total of 93 STRs, the majority of which were received between 2009 and 2010
- Most common types of STR are:
 - Fraudulent letter 13.5%
 - Suspicious source of funds 13.5%
 - Customer suspected/known criminal 12.5%




DFSA STR Statistics

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
STR Trends



Year	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Number	1	4	14	11	31	32



Origin of Firm vs STRs Lodged





Best Practices in STR Preparation

The following documents should be submitted with an STR:

- Covering letter duly signed and stamped by the MLRO with the subject clearly mentioned as STR & the name of the customer/s
- 2. STR Form Reporting Entities are encouraged to include more details, apart from those that have been expressly stated in the STR Form. They may also enclose an attachment to the STR Form to include such comprehensive details, should the space in the STR Form be insufficient



Best Practices in STR Preparation

- 3. KYC details to include ultimate beneficial owners and their details in case of entities, apart from the mandatory KYC details
- Identification documents (such as passports, incorporation documents, certificates of registration) – also Memorandum of Association, if available
- Grounds for suspicion to be comprehensive and to include the reason for filing the STR
- Bank statements / policies / risk assessments; to include Account Opening Documents / Application Forms



Best Practices in STR Preparation

- 7. In case of suspected fraudulent transfers or suspected financial transactions, copies of SWIFT messages
- 8. Any other documents / information that are relevant

Word document available for STR lodgment



Clearly Identify Source of Suspicion

- Adverse background check results for customer
 - Media
 - Customer Due Diligence Vendor
- Activity inconsistent with customer profile/objective
- Suspicious source of funds
- Suspicious customer behavior



Clearly Identify Source of Suspicion

- Suspicious account activity
 - Unusually large transaction / Irregular activity
- Scam
 - Phishing scam
 - Fake identity / Fictitious company
- Fraud
 - Documents / Instructions / Instrument
 - Advance fee fraud
 - Investment fraud or corporate crime



All original STRs must be sent to the AMLSCU!

For STR enquiries or lodging a <u>copy</u> of an STR: <u>STRunit@dfsa.ae</u>





Case Study

DIFC Limited, a subsidiary of a UK parent:

- Promotes access to a platform on which clients trade in securities;
- Markets securities and the platform operated by its parent;
- Facilitates the on-boarding of Clients to the parent's platform;
- The Client was encouraged to join the platform by a RM who transitioned the Client from another AF in which the RM worked. The Client makes transfers of funds to the subsidiary's bank accounts via international electronic payment systems;
- A Client trading in options on the platform loses \$5m through trading activities;
- A lawyer acting on behalf of the Client and a third party complain to the DFSA that:
 - His clients lost \$5m trading options;
 - DIFC Limited allowed his Clients to trade on the platform without carrying out appropriate due diligence on his Clients.
- The lawyers of the Client and third party ask the DFSA to investigate and commence proceedings pursuant to Article 94 Regulatory Law to recover their losses;
- The lawyers are contemplating litigation in the DIFC Court;
- DIFC Limited believes that all clients are clients of the parent and not the subsidiary and therefore DIFC Limited does not have to undertake customer due diligence.



DFSA Response

- Assess the complaint & information verification
- Interview complainants
- Gathering relevant information

Objective

- To determine if a <u>suspicion of a contravention</u> exists
- Commence Investigation



DFSA's Objectives

- To preserve the integrity of the DIFC
- Determine the extent of the risk one off systemic
- Rectify the failure
- Mitigate the risk
- Protect consumers
- Compensate victims
- Sanction wrongdoing



Who Should Be Concerned?

- DIFC Limited
- The Governing Body
- Senior Management SEO
- The MLRO and Compliance Officer
- The relationship officer
- The shareholders
- All of the above



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Red Flags - Risk Based Approach

Vulnerabilities

- Product higher risk limited cash flow controls
- Services Electronic payments internet trading
- Customers non face to face PEPs high risk jurisdictions
- Legal Interpretation of law
- Staff Understanding and application of obligations
- Commercial realities and pressures



Relationship Managers

• Firm's greatest strength in the fight against Money Laundering

But are also an area for vulnerability

- Complacency
- Becoming too close
- Potential conflicts



Knowing Your Client, Always

- Personal Details
- Nature & Level of Business
- Origin of Funds
- Source of wealth
- Updated KYC: AML 3.4.3(1)(a)
- Document Retention 6 years from when relationship ends



Client Take-on & Classification

- Requirements of Client Agreement
- Client Classification supports KYC



Policies and Procedures

- The AML Module should not be your firm's P&P's
- Practicality and Applicability to your firm
- Is your staff aware of them
- Internal Review process
- Empower you as Compliance Officers
- Complaints handling process



Systems and Controls

- AML 3.1.1
- Are they understood by you and your staff?
- Do they ensure that evidence is obtained, accurate and up to date?
- Do they take into account your business' specific needs?
- Monitor and detect suspicious transactions and customers.
- Take into account developments in AML sphere.
- Do you regularly review them?



Case Study - Findings 1

- 2000 Clients from multiple jurisdictions
- USD 20m in clients' funds held
- Ineffective analysis and classification of clients (COB 2.3.2)
- Lack of Client Agreements (COB 3.3.2)
- Lack of Suitability Assessments (COB 3.4.2)
- Clients acting beneficially for others (AML 3.4.2)
- Ineffective KYC (AML 3.4.1)



Case Study – Findings 2

- No enhanced due diligence (AML 3.7.1)
- Failure to maintain clients' files (AML3.4.8)
- Failing to update records (AML 3.4.1)
- System and Controls failure to identify PEPs (AML 3.7.2)
- System and Controls failure to detect suspicious transactions (AML 3.7.3)
- Failure to monitor incoming funds transfers (AML 3.8.1)
- Failure to train employees (AML 3.9.1)



What Are Risks To You?

- Supervision / Investigation time and cost drain
- Litigation: By complainant and DFSA
 - Compensation Prohibition Orders Business Restrictions
 - Disgorgement orders
- Regulatory action
 - Sanctions fines censures
 - Other sanctions audit report Licence function withdrawal bannings – return funds
- Reputation damage



What Will The DFSA Do?

- Conduct a theme review
- Provide a Report Article 74
 - Appoint an expert SUP 4.2.1
 - Expert must cooperate with the DFSA
- Restriction on Business Article 75
 - Entering into certain transactions
 - Soliciting business from specified persons
 - Carrying on business in a specified manner



What Will The DFSA Do?

- Conduct an investigation
- Exercise its powers under Art 73 and 80
- Determine if the problem is isolated or systemic
- Impose remedial action and/or sanctions



Penalties

Trends

- Increase in financial penalties
- Enhancements to AML Corporate Governance
- MLROs and Senior Management being targeted



Penalty Examples

Year	Jurisdiction & Regulator	Firm	Action Taken					
Dec 2010	USA, FINRA	Global Strategic Investments LLC	Global was given financial penalty of USD150,000 Banned CO for 6 months.					
Sep 2010	USA, OCC	Intercredit Bank	Financial penalty of USD200,000					
Jul 2010	USA, FINRA	Skyebanc Inc	Financial penalty of USD30,000					
May 2010	UK, FSA	Alpari (UK) Ltd	Financial penalty of circa USD226,296 MLRO was given penalty of circa USD22,629					
Feb 2010	USA, FINRA	Penson Financial Services	Financial penalty of USD450,000					
Feb 2010	USA, FINRA		Financial penalty of \$300,000					
Oct 2010	USA, FINCEN	Pinnacle Capital Markets	Civil Penalty USD50,000					
	USA, SEC		Financial penalty of USD25,000					
Oct 2009	USA, FINRA	Scottrade Inc	Financial penalty of USD600,000					
Oct 2008	UK, FSA	Sindicatum Holdings Ltd.	Financial penalty of circa GBP80,000					
Nov 2005	UK, FSA	Investment Services UK Ltd	Financial penalty of circa GBP280,000 MD was given penalty of circa GBP48,000					



Lessons Learnt

Mitigate your risks by:

- Understanding your obligations
- Obtaining good advice
- Identifying the key risks to your business
- Ensuring Policies & Procedures are practical and applicable
- Properly educating staff
- Implementing sound systems and controls
- Conducting regular reviews

